Introduction
In recent years, the wireless communication has been used in many areas. One important area using the wireless communication is IoT (Internet of Things) which represents a type of network where low-cost devices linked to the internet perform information exchange. Low-cost devices represent computationally, memory and power constrained devices. IoT is used in smart homes, smart hospitals, smart cities, etc. According to [1] , it is expected that IoT, which excludes PCs, tablets and smartphones, will grow to 24 billion units installed in 2020. This is a huge number of devices. Data created by these devices involved in the IoT must be secured in order to be credible. IoT usually uses low-cost devices to collect and exchange data from sensors and other equipments by Wireless Sensor Network (WSN), Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) technology, 3G and 4G mobile connections, Wi-Fi, WiMAX and etc.
Common cryptographic algorithms as the asymmetric cryptosystem RSA (Rivest, Shamir, Adleman) with the modulus size 2048 bits or the symmetric cipher AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) with the key size 256 bits cannot be implemented on low-cost devices since these algorithms are demanding in terms of the computing power and memory resources. For that reason, security on low-cost devices is ensured by algorithms from light-weight cryptography. Light-weight cryptography uses algorithms which have small demands to the computing power and the memory resources. In most cases, light-weight cryptography uses symmetric cryptography to ensure security. Symmetric cryptography is generally less computationally and memory demanding in comparison with asymmetric cryptography. The basic terms in security are authentication, integrity, confidentiality and non-repudiation. Authentication ensures a verification of authenticity of communication entities. Integrity ensures a verification of data integrity. Confidentiality ensures that secret data cannot be available to unauthorized entities. Non-repudiation ensures that an entity cannot deny some fact which was realized in the past.
In this paper, we focus on authentication on low-cost devices which are used in IoT. We have proposed a new light-weight protocol for mutual authentication of communication entities with non-repudiation of realized events. Nonrepudiation is ensured by involving a TTP to the communication. In Sec. 2 an overview of the most widely used light-weight authentication protocols is given. The principle of the proposed protocol is described in Sec. 3 and its formal security analysis is performed in Sec. 4. Demands to computing resources and transmitted data in the protocol are described in Sec. 5. Finally, the paper is concluded in Sec. 6.
State of the Art
Many authentication protocols for low-cost devices were proposed. There are various different ways how to create a light-weight authentication protocol. The authors of [2] , [3] presented an authentication protocol suitable for implementation in low-cost RFID which uses Lattice based cryptography. In the papers [4] , [5] , the authors use Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) for authentication. The authors of [6] presented an authentication scheme for WSN which is based on implicit certificates and it provides application level end-to-end security. In the articles [7] , [8] , light-weight authentication protocols which use McEliece public cryptography were presented. The authors of [9] and [10] designed light-weight authentication protocols for RFID which use an error correction code. The authors of [11] use the Fermat Number Transform (FNT) and the Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT) for light-weight authentication. In [12] , a novel authentication protocol for RFID tags using shared pseudonyms and Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC) to achieve a reader to tag authentication was proposed. More suggestions of light-weight authentication protocols using CRC were described in [13] , [14] . The authors of [15] presented a light-weight authentication protocol which uses a ring variant of the LPN (Learning Parity with Noise) problem. In the paper [16] , a light-weight authentication protocol for RFID using a stream cipher was described. The authors of [17] proposed a lightweight message authentication scheme for smart grids which uses the Diffie-Hellman protocol to establish the shared session key and a hash function for authentication. Another light-weight authentication protocol using a hash function was presented in [18] . In [19] , a lightweight authentication protocol for RFID using pseudonyms and simple bitwise operations as AND, OR, XOR and bitwise rotation was described. The authors of [20] presented a light-weight authentication protocol which uses Physical Unclonable Functions (PUF), Linear Feedback Shift Registers (LFSR) and XOR operations. In [21] , a light-weight authentication protocol which uses a PUF and the Hopper Blum (HB) protocol was described.
Presented light-weight authentication protocols often focus on concrete low-cost devices which determine their security. Simple authentication schemes using CRC and bitwise logical operations do not provide integrity of transmitted data. Authentication protocols which use a stream cipher can produce a lower level of diffuse which facilitates cryptanalysis. Authentication protocols built on elliptic curves can be broken using the Shor's algorithm [22] in the case of constructing a universal quantum computer. Due to advances in the quantum area, the future use of these authentication protocols seems unpromising. The protection against attacks led from universal quantum computers providing protocols which use Lattice based cryptography, McEliece cryptography, hash functions or generally symmetric cryptography. Hash functions have small demands to the computing power and memory resources while provide integrity of data and robust security to input data, therefore, they are the most used cryptographic primitive on low-cost devices to ensure authentication. PUF represent a new perspective way how to ensure authentication on low-cost devices. PUF represent an alternative to common storage secret keys in nonvolatile memories. PUF utilize manufacturing heterogeneities and differences of components of a physical device to generate random outputs (secret keys) on the fly. The generated output of PUF is called a hardware fingerprint of the device. The advantages of PUF are reduction of a price and increasing of security. The main disadvantage of PUF is a noise in generated outputs. These errors in PUF outputs are usually corrected by an error correction code. The disadvantage of an error correction code is that it requires a permanent memory which increases the price of the device.
Our Proposal of Authentication Protocol
Based on the analysis of light-weight authentication protocols provided in Sec. 2, we have proposed a new lightweight mutual authentication protocol with non-repudiation of realized events. The protocol is suitable for implementation on low-cost devices used in IoT. There are a Trusted Third Party and the User A and the User B in the protocol. The proposed protocol uses only an appropriate lightweight hash function and pre-shared secret data. The protocol ensures authenticity of communication entities, integrity of transmitted data, security of secret authentication keys and non-repudiation of realized events. The proposed protocol uses a TTP to ensure non-repudiation of realized events. According to the standard ISO/IEC 13888-2:2010 the TTP can be used to ensure non-repudiation using symmetric cryptography. This standard provides a description of generic structures that can be used for non-repudiation services and it also describes some specific communication-related mechanisms which can be used to provide non-repudiation of origin and non-repudiation of delivery. The ISO/IEC 13888-2:2010 relies on the existence of a TTP to prevent fraudulent repudiation or accusation. An online TTP is usually needed. Table 1 shows notations used in our protocol and their meaning. It represents increasing the sequence number x by one. The proposed protocol consists of the two phases, an initialization phase and an authentication phase. The initialization phase must be performed before the authentication phase. Entities involved in the protocol exchange pre-shared data in the initialization phase. A communication between communication sides is ensured by a wireless communication in the initialization phase. The communicating entities approach so that transmitted data cannot be captured by an attacker in the initialization phase. The User A and the User B exchange their unique public identifiers ID A , ID B and a secret authentication key K AB . The User A and the TTP exchange their unique public identifiers ID A , ID TTP and a secret authentication key K ATTP . The User B and the TTP exchange their unique public identifiers ID B , ID TTP and a secret authentication key K BTTP . The User A must keep secret the authentication keys K AB and K ATTP . The User B must keep secret the authentication keys K AB and K BTTP . The TTP must keep secret the authentication keys K ATTP and K BTTP . The unique identifiers ID A , ID B and ID TTP are public values. The principle of mutual authentication with non-repudiation of realized events is depicted in Fig. 1 . In this case, the communication is started by the User A. If the communication starts by the User B, the principle will be mirrored opposite. Seven messages, which are exchanged between the TTP, the User A and the User B, are used in the authentication phase.
In the messages 1 -7, the first ID defines the recipient of the messages 1 -7, the second ID defines the sender of the messages 1 -7 and the third ID defines the recipient of authentication data (in the messages 1, 3 and 5) and the sender of authentication data (in the messages 2, 4 and 6). Authentication data represent hashes (which include the secret authentication key K AB ) and their corresponding sequence numbers. The hashes h 2 , h 3 , h 5 , h 6 , h 8 , h 9 and h 10 ensure integrity and authenticity of the messages 1 -7. All transmitted data with the secret authentication key (K ATTP or K BTTP ) are inserted to the input of the hash function. Output hashes are inserted after transmitted data in the messages 1 -7. Authentication between the User A and the TTP is ensured using the secret authentication key K ATTP and the sequence number Sn ATTP in the hashes h 2 , h 6 and h 8 . Authentication between the User B and the TTP is ensured using the secret authentication key K BTTP and the sequence number Sn BTTP in the hashes h 3 , h 5 , h 9 and h 10 . Authentication between the User A and B is ensured using the secret authentication key K AB and the sequence number Sn AB in the hashes h 1 , h 4 and h 7 .
The principle of authentication between communication entities is as follows. An entity creates an authentication hash using the secret authentication key and the sequence number (in the hashes h 1 , h 4 and h 7 ) and using other data (in the hashes h 2 , h 3 , h 5 , h 6 , h 8 , h 9 and h 10 ). After that, the entity sends the created authentication hash with sequence number and other data to an opposite entity. The opposite entity compares the received authentication hash with its own authentication hash which the entity computed by the hash function using the received sequence number (and other data) and its own secret authentication key which shares with the communication entity. If they are equal, integrity and au-thenticity of transmitted data will be guaranteed. After that the opposite entity compares the received sequence number with the sequence number which used in the previous communication with the communication entity. If the received sequence number is bigger than the sequence number which the opposite entity used in the previous communication with the entity, the freshness of the authentication hash will be guaranteed.
In the case when a communication is started by the User A, the hash h 1 represents the requirement for authentication of the User A to the User B and the hash h 2 represents the proof of sending the hash h 1 . The hash h 4 represents the requirement for authentication of the User B to the User A (also represents the confirmation of realized authentication of the User A to the User B) and the hash h 5 represents the proof of sending the hash h 4 . The hash h 7 represents the confirmation of realized authentication of the User B to the User A and the hash h 8 represents the proof of sending the hash h 7 . The User B saves the hashes h 1 and h 2 and the corresponding sequence numbers Sn AB and Sn ATTP to his database for the case of dispute, when the User A will argue that he did not send the request to authentication to the User B through the TTP. The User A saves the hashes h 4 and h 5 and the corresponding sequence numbers Sn AB and Sn BTTP to his database for the case of dispute, when the User B will argue that he did not authenticate the User A and he did not send the request to authentication to the User A through the TTP. The User B saves the hashes h 7 and h 8 and the corresponding sequence numbers Sn AB and Sn ATTP to his database for the case of dispute, when the User A will argue that he did not authenticate the User B.
An entity involved in the authentication phase (the TTP, the User A and the User B) sends a message to a counterpart and waits the specific time for a response. If the entity does not receive the response to the sent message in the specific time from the counterpart, the entity will resend that message to the counterpart. Each message can be repeatedly sent only several times. The number of repeatedly sent messages must be chosen suitably for the concrete environment.
In the case when a communication is started by the User A, three following disputes may occur in our protocol:
1.) The User B claims that he received the request for authentication from the User A through the TTP while the User A claims that he did not send the request for authentication to the User B through the TTP.
2.)
The User A claims that he was authenticated by the User B and that he received the request for authentication from the User B trought the TTP while the User B claims that he did not authenticate the User A and he did not send the request for authentication to the User A through the TTP.
3.)
The User B claims that he was authenticated by the User A while the User A claims that he did not authenticate the User B.
The TTP solves these dispute in the following way. The User B will send hashes h 1 , h 2 , h 7 , h 8 and the corresponding sequence numbers Sn AB , Sn ATTP to the TTP for the solution of the dispute 1 and 3. The User A will send hashes h 4 , h 5 and the corresponding sequence numbers Sn AB and Sn BTTP to the TTP for the solution of the dispute 2. The TTP creates hashes h 2 , h 5 , h 8 using constants, the received values from the User B and the User A and using its own secret key K ATTP and K BTTP . The TTP compares the received hashes with computed hashes. If they are equal, the TTP will agree with the User B in the dispute 1 and 3 and with the User A in the dispute 2.
Security Analysis of Authentication Protocol
Security of the initialization phase is based on the secure channel. Security of the authentication phase with nonrepudiation of realized events is based on cryptographic properties of hash functions, secret authentication keys, sequence numbers and the trust of the User A and the User B to the TTP. If the authentication key is revealed by an attacker, the authentication key will be invalidated for future communications. In the authentication phase the following cryptographic properties are ensured:
Authenticity -Authentication of the User A and the User B is ensured by a hash function and the secret shared key K AB , which is transmitted in the hashes h 1 , h 4 and h 7 . Authentication of the User A and the TTP is ensured by a hash function and the secret shared key K ATTP , which is transmitted in the hashes h 2 , h 6 and h 8 . Authentication of the User B and the TTP is ensured by a hash function and the secret shared key K BTTP , which is transmitted in the hashes h 3 , h 5 , h 9 and h 10 .
Unrepeatability -Unrepeatability of transmitted data is ensured by the public sequence numbers Sn AB , Sn ATTP and Sn BTTP . The sequence number Sn AB is transmitted in the hashes h 1 , h 4 and h 7 . The sequence number Sn ATTP is transmitted in the hashes h 2 , h 6 and h 8 . The sequence number Sn BTTP is transmitted in the hashes h 3 , h 5 , h 9 and h 10 . Entities involved in the protocol do not respond to messages containing the sequence number which is less or equal to the last correctly used sequence number between communication parties.
Integrity -Integrity of transmitted data is ensured by a hash function in the steps 1 -7. All transmitted data are inserted on the input of the hash function in the each step. The output hashes h 2 , h 3 , h 5 , h 6 , h 8 , h 9 and h 10 are attached after the transmitted data in the steps 1 -7. The receiver computes a hash with using received data and his secret authentication key and compares it with the hash which received together with transmitted data. If they are equal, integrity and authenticity of transmitted data will be ensured.
Security -Security of the secret authentication keys K AB , K ATTP and K BTTP is ensured by a hash function. The hash function is a one-way compression function ⇒ it is not possible to get the input values from the output of the hash function.
Uniformity -Uniformity of hashes h 2 , h 3 , h 5 , h 6 , h 8 , h 9 and h 10 is ensured by the sequence numbers Sn AB , Sn ATTP and Sn BTTP and a hash function. A change of one bit on the input of the hash function causes an unpredictable random change of all output bits with 50% probability. This feature of hash functions ensures that very similar messages have different output hashes.
Non-repudiation -Non-repudiation of sending the request for authentication and realized authentication is ensured by the TTP. When the communication is started by the User A, the hash h 2 represents the proof of submission of the request for authentication to the User B from the User A through the TTP. The hash h 5 represents the proof of realized authentication of the User A to the User B and the proof of submission the request for authentication to the User A from the User B through the TTP. The hash h 8 represents the proof of realized authentication of the User B to the User A through the TTP.
Authentication protocols must work correctly and safely. Formal methods for an analysis of security cryptographic protocols can be used for this purpose. These methods are able to find security threats in cryptographic protocols. The most widely used method for the formal analysis of authentication protocols is the BAN (Burrows, Abadi, Needham) logic [23] . We provided formal analysis of the authentication phase in our protocol by the BAN logic. To analyse the authentication phase, we give the following assumptions by the BAN logic:
A believes A and TTP believes fresh (Sn ATTP , Sn BTTP ).
We analyse the idealized version of our protocol by applying rules of the BAN logic to the assumptions. We give many of the formal details necessary for the proof only for the message 1 for brevity.
Based on the BAN logic, we idealize the message 1 as:
The main steps of the proof are as follows:
The TTP receives the message 1. The annotation rules yield that
holds afterward. Since we have the hypothesis
The message-meaning rule for shared secrets applies and yields the following:
We break conjunctions and then we produce
Moreover, we have the following hypothesis:
TTP believes fresh (Sn ATTP ).
The nonce-verification rule applies and yields
Again, we break the conjunction to obtain the following:
This concludes the analysis of the message 1 of the authentication phase in the proposed protocol.
The proposed protocol should be resistant to the attacks which are shown in Tab. 2. Table 2 also shows the ways which are used to a protection against the mentioned attacks. The protection against the replay attack is ensured by the sequence numbers Sn AB , Sn ATTP and Sn BTTP . The Man in the Middle (MiM) attack is not possible because the secret authentication keys K AB , K ATTP and K BTTP are exchanged by the secure channel in the initialization phase. The eavesdropping attack is not possible because the secret authentication keys K AB , K ATTP and K BTTP are protected by a hash function. It is not possible to get the input values from the output hash of the -h 10 ) . The attack using the Shor's algorithm [22] is not possible since our protocol does not use the integer factorization problem, the problem of the discrete logarithm, elliptic curves, hyperelliptic curves, class groups and etc.
In our proposed protocol a hash function with the digest size equal 160 bits is intended. The hash function with the digest size equal 160 bits has effective security equal to 80 bits because the birthday paradox decreases security of hash functions to half. The authentication keys must be updated after using up the range of the sequence numbers. For the sequence number equal to 16 bits, the authentication key may be used 2 16 (65 536) times. Authentication keys may be saved in a Secure Element which represents a tamper resistant hardware platform, capable of storing confidential and cryptographic data.
Demands of Proposed Protocol
Our authentication protocol has low demands to computing resources and transmitted data. The entities involved in the protocol compute only a light-weight hash function. Table 3 shows demands to computing resources and transmitted data of our protocol in the authentication phase for the User A, the TTP and the User B. The authors of [24] implemented different light-weight hash functions on an ATMEL AVR ATtiny45 8-bit microcontroller and provided their performance evaluation. Table 4 shows memory requirements and a performance of lightweight hash functions PHOTON-160/36/36, SPONGENT-160/160/80 and Keccak [r = 40, c = 160]. These hash functions have the digest size equal to 160 b. In Tab. 4 there are the code size in bytes, the size of needed memory for RAM state and others in bytes and the cycle count for 100-byte message of selected light-weight hash functions. [25] 1730 [26] 1300 [27] Tab. 5. Hardware area of selected light-weight hash functions.
Hash function
Our protocol is aimed to use in low-rate wireless personal area networks (LR-WPANs), which are defined in the standard 802.15.4. For example, the specification ZigBee falls under this standard. Typically, for the ZigBee protocol, the required latency is in the range approximately 16-32 ms [28] .
If authentication is ensured by the principle of the onetime pad technique in a combination with symmetric cryptography (stream cipher or block cipher), demands for resources will grow. Since communication entities must keep random authentication keys in a database, they must be updated after their exhaustion. Also, the generation of true random numbers for the one-time pad technique is an expensive question. If a stream cipher is used, integrity of transmitted data will not be ensured.
Conclusion
In this paper a new light-weight mutual authentication protocol with non-repudiation of realized events was presented. Our protocol is simple and uses only a light-weight hash function and incrementation of public sequence numbers. The advantages of the proposed protocol are its simplicity, low computing and memory demands, ensuring integrity of transmitted data, non-repudiation of realized events by symmetric cryptography and resistance against attacks coming from universal quantum computers (using the Shor's algorithm) in comparison with other light-weight authentication protocols. In the our feature work, we will implement the proposed protocol on RFID, Smart cards and wireless sensors and we will measure its performance, memory requirements and resistance against side channel attacks.
